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Abstract 
One of the major challenges to policy makers is the identification of standard framework to examine the effects 
of corporate governance on firm financial performance. This study examines the key corporate governance and 
financial performance variables and the methods of data analysis used in academic research. The study observes 
that most studies use ownership structure and corporate boards as the key explanatory factors to firm 
performance. Ownership structure is defined by the percentage of shareholders who include: the government, 
foreign and institutional shareholders, large individuals and dispersed owners. Financial performance has been 
measured using three different types of indicators. Some studies use accounting-based ratios such as Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) while others use the Tobin’s Q ratio. Some studies also use 
efficiency indicators computed using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochaistic Frontier Approach 
(SFA). It is also apparent that most studies in corporate governance research use panel data and the shareholding, 
corporate boards and financial information is extracted from financial reports obtained from the stock exchanges. 
Most of the studies use a combination of descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis to examine the 
relationships between ownership structure, corporate boards and firm performance. Due to problems associated 
with panel data, a unit root test is used to examine stationarity of data while a Hausman test determines whether 
to use a Fixed Effects (FE) or Random effects regression model. A regression model with a robust standard error 
option is often used to control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation which may lead to 
spurious results. 
 
1.0 Introduction  
Research in corporate governance stems from the problems associated with the wide separation of ownership and 
control in modern corporations leading to inefficiency and loss of firm value. According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) the existence of the agency relationship in the firm leads to conflicts of interest between the shareholders 
and the managers. Agency theory identifies several approaches through which shareholders assure themselves of 
getting returns on their investment. The theory identifies large block shareholders as a mechanism to reduce 
agency conflicts as the owners are more active in monitoring managers due to the size of ownership. According 
to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large shareholders obtain power over their investment by matching control with 
cash flow rights. Agency theory also identifies corporate boards as a mechanism to protection of shareholders 
interests and ensures maximization of shareholder value. Jensen and Meckling (1976)  indicates that  corporate 
boards can effectively play their role its size is small, has diverse of skills, and with majority of outside directors 
and the position of Chairman and CEO are separate. These systems continue to evolve by encouraging greater 
diversity accountability, discipline, fairness, independence, responsibility, transparency and disclosure in 
governance. 
One of the major challenges in research however has been the development of standard model to analyze the 
influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial performance.  The traditional standard 
framework to analyze corporate governance practices is provided by the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. These principles have been adopted in many countries and coded as good corporate governance 
practices for listed firms and focus on shareholders rights, board responsibilities and disclosure of information 
among others (CMA, 2002; OECD, 2005).  The concern of policy makers however, is to attach measurable value 
to the concept of governance and consequently the empirical approaches towards establishing its influence on 
financial performance. This study reviews the key corporate governance variables used as the key determinant of 
financial performance and the theoretical justification for the predicted relationships. The study also looks at the 
modern econometric   methods of data analysis in corporate in corporate governance studies. The paper is 
divided into five sections. Section one presents the introduction, section two discusses the methodology used in 
this study while section three discusses the concept of corporate governance and the measurement of variables 
derived from the concept. Section four discusses the key methods of data analysis in corporate governance 
research while section five is the conclusion of the study. 
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2.0  Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this study involves a review and discussion of the concept of corporate governance 
and the operational meaning attached to variables derived from the concept. The review also includes theoretical 
prediction of expected relationships between corporate governance variables and firm financial performance. 
The study further discusses the methods of data analysis largely used in corporate governance research 
 
3.0  The Concept of Corporate Governance and its Measurements  
Corporate governance has been defined as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting returns on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It has also been defined as a 
system by which companies are directed and controlled to ensure maximum return to shareholders (Mallin, 
2007). The OECD (2005) indicates that corporate governance specifies the distribution of rights to income, rules 
and procedures for making decisions in corporate affairs and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the shareholders, corporate boards and managers. Given these definitions, most studies use 
ownership structure and corporate board as the explanatory   variables to financial performance. The variables 
and their measurements are discussed in the following subsections.   
3.1 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure defines the distribution of ownership rights which enable shareholders to have claims of 
income from and also empower them to exercise decision making through voting rights (Grossman and Hart, 
1988). This description includes the dimensions of size of ownership and the identity of owners. The size defines 
the rights to profits, extent of liability and influence in decision making in a firm, through voting over key issues. 
The identity of the shareholder is important as they comprise of individuals and institutions whose interests, 
goals, resources and capabilities to influence financial performance vary (OECD, 2005). A listed company has 
five types of shareholders who include:  the government, foreign institutional, large individuals, and dispersed 
owners. 
Government ownership has been measured by the percentage of shares held by the state and also by institutions 
wholly owned by government. The relationship between government shareholding ownership and performance is 
considered detrimental to firm performance and this is supported by several theories. The property rights theory 
predicts that the state as an owner will not perform as efficiently as private firms. According to Hanke (1987), 
firms with general public as a collective owner and hence have no direct claim on their residual income which 
reduces incentives to monitor firm managers. Laffornte and Tirole (1991) also indicate that State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) have multiple objectives that make them less focused on profit making. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) also assert that firms with large state ownership are inefficient as they serve political interests.  According 
the Agency theory, the wide separation between ownership and control makes it difficult for the state to monitor 
managers. 
Institutional ownership has been measured by the percentage of shares held by private institutions. These 
institutions are defined as organizations, rather than an individual that invests funds on behalf of their members 
and include: financial institutions, collective investment scheme, insurance companies, pension funds or other 
body corporate whose ordinary business includes the management or investment of funds (La Porta, et al., 2000; 
OECD, 2010). The relationship between local institutions shareholders and performance remains ambiguous. On 
one hand, their role is also deemed to be crucial due to their ability to raise capital, monitor managers, interest in 
profits and expertise in managerial and marketing skills (OECD, 2010). They are expected to improve firm 
performance by exercising their oversight functions and influence decision making in firms where they invest 
(Kose and Senbert, 1998; OECD, 2010). They are also considered crucial in provision of resources in the form of 
access to private capital, networks, managerial and financial expertise to enable firms to exploit unique 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Hu and Izumida, 2008). 
 
These arguments suggest that institutional investors positively influence firm performance. Contrary to these 
views their presence may impact negatively to financial performance. According to Wei et al. (2005), some of 
institutional shareholders are largely owned by the state.  Consequently, such institutions are characterized by 
large separation of ownership and control which makes the government have little control and supervision over 
managers leaving them to pursue their interests. They are also perceived to be less focused on profit making due 
to multiplicity of the objectives they pursue (Laffornte and Tirole, 1991). Given the contrasting perspectives, the 
relationship between institutional shareholders and firm performance is of empirical concern. 
  
Foreign institutional investors constitute a distinct category of ownership with governance implications which 
could ultimately affect the performance of firms. They consist of entities incorporated by the laws outside the 
country under study. In the Kenya context, they are defined as entities incorporated by the laws outside the East 
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African states.  The relationship between foreign investors and firm performance is largely expected to be 
positive.  According to Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), firms with large foreign shareholders gain from their 
financial resources, expertise in technical and managerial skills, and access to new markets. Foreign institutional 
shareholders are deemed to be more effective in monitoring of managers and endowed with expertise and 
technologies to stimulate performance (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999). However, foreign institutional investors 
could also impact on performance negatively if ownership is motivated by private benefits of control. 
 
Dispersed shareholders are defined as the individuals and institutions that purchases small amounts of 
shareholding (La Porta, et al., 2000). Dispersed shareholding has been measured by the percentage of ownership 
held by this category. Theoretical work on the relationship between dispersed shareholders and performance is 
inconclusive. From the perspective of portfolio theory, investing in a very large number of shareholders 
maximizes the benefits of diversified investment through elimination of individual firm financial risk. 
Shareholders are also expected to put pressure on managers to perform as they demand dividend and influence 
decision making through the annual general meetings. This view contradicts the agency theory which conjectures 
that individual shareholders are diffused and may not have incentives and mechanisms to effectively monitor 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The ownership variables identified in this sub section have been 
widely used as independent variables in studies examining the relationship between the ownership structure and 
financial performance (Mei, 2013; Mishari et al. 2012; Wei, et al., 2005; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Trien and 
Chizema, 2011; Uwuigbe and Olusanmi 2012).  
 
3.2 Corporate Boards  
Corporate boards are an important governance mechanism due to their roles which involves monitoring 
managers, protecting shareholders interests and setting strategies in a firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The agency 
theory specifies the attributes necessary to make the board effective and include: a small and diverse board with 
at least a third of the members being non executive and separation of roles for the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and the chairman of board (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The optimal size of the board is not specified but 
some authors argue that a small board to include of a maximum of seven to nine members to function effectively 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). A smaller board is considered more effective in coordination and in 
decision making. However, some studies indicate that a larger board monitor is more effective in monitoring and 
advising managers as organizations exist in complex business environments (Pfeffer, 1972). Board size in 
previous studies has been measured by the total number of directors (Adusei, 2011; Chaghadari, 2011; Yermack, 
1996).  
 
Diversity in corporate boards often refers to the percentage of outside directors serving on the board (Adusei, 
2011; Chaghadari, 2011). From an Agency Theory perspective the Non Executive Directors (NEDs) are crucial 
due to their role in monitoring and preventing conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. According 
to Fama and Jensen (1983) they are more effective as they are concerned with maintaining their integrity and 
reputation in the labor market. From a resource based theoretical perspective, the NEDs have access to unique 
expertise thereby enriching corporate strategies and decision making (Rashid, et al., 2010). Diversity also 
involves reflecting the structure of the society, gender balance, ethnicity and diverse professions to enable a firm 
respond effectively to the dynamic of business environment. From an Agency Theory perspective, women 
directors bring new perspectives and are useful in strategy formulation and understanding of certain markets. 
Srindhi et al. (2011) also argues that boards with more women have greater public disclosure and better 
oversight of managers. From a Resource Based theoretical perspective, women directors bring in additional 
expertise, market networks and ethical views crucial in decision making (Letting et al., 2012). The corporate 
governance guidelines also emphasize separation of the position of the CEO and that of the chairman of the 
board (OECD, 2005; CMA, 2002).  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) separation of the two positions 
ensures that no individual dominate in corporate decision-making. The governance variables identified in this 
subsection are used as independent variables while investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of privatized companies (Adams and Mehran, 2011; Chaghadari (2011) Latief et al., 
2014; María and Sánchez, 2010; Rashid et al., 2010). 
 
3.3 Financial Performance 
Financial performance has been measured using different indicators. Some authors use accounting-based ratios 
such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) (Afeikhena, 2008; Omran, 2004). The ROA 
measures the percentage of profit that a firm earns from its total assets and therefore measures how efficiently 
managers use company assets to generate profit. ROE is an indicator of profit raised using shareholder funds 
(Megginson et al., 1994). The accounting based ratios are however considered inadequate as they are an 
indicator of short-term performance. They also evaluate past performance and hence lag the actions that bring 
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about the results (Letting et al., 2012).  This is largely used in studies comparing the pre and post privatization 
performance. 
 
Performance is also measured by the Tobin’s Q defined as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost 
of the firm's physical assets (Carter et al., 2010; Trien and Chizema (2011; Wei et al., 2005). Unlike the 
accounting ratios, the Tobin’s Q reflects the investor’s opinion and growth prospects of a firm based on past and 
current performance. Mule et al. (2013) also indicates that the Tobin's Q ratio gauges the investors’ confidence 
in a firm’s business prospects and how closely the managers and shareholders’ interests are aligned. According 
to Morck, (1988), it is a measure of growth prospects of assets, defined by the future profitability of the assets in 
relation to their replacement value.  Consequently, a ratio of less than 1.0 implies that the market value is lower 
than the assets of the firm and hence it would cost more to replace a firm’s assets than it’s worth. It is considered 
that the higher the value of Q, the more effective are the governance mechanisms and the better is the market’s 
perception of the company’s performance. This indicator of performance has been widely used in studies 
examining the causal relationships between ownership structure and firm performance (Mei, 2013; Mrad and 
Hallara, 2012; Ongore et al., 2011;Wei, et al., 2005; Yiwei et al., 2011; Mishari et al.,2012). 
 
Some authors measure performance using efficiency indicators such as total sales, the ratio of sales to employees 
and total asset turnover (Sun and Tong, 2002; Ochieng and Ahmed, 2014 Omran, 2004). The accounting based 
ratios are however inadequate as they are an indicator of short-term performance. They also evaluate past 
performance and hence lag the actions that bring about the results (Letting et al., 2012).  However, there is an 
increased trend in measuring efficiency of corporate entities using cost and technical efficiency indicators 
(Kamaruddin and Abokaresh, 2012; Sifunjo et al., 2014; Yiwei et al., 2011).  The concept of cost efficiency was 
introduced by Leibenstein’s (1966) and estimates how close a firm’s actual costs are to the costs of a best-
practice firm producing the same outputs. Cost inefficiency may therefore arise where manager’s use more 
inputs than would a best practice firm or employ an input mix that does not minimize costs for a given input 
price (Sifunjo et al., 2014). According to Leibenstein’s (1966) inefficiency may be attributed to managerial 
deficiencies, lack of external and internal pressure on managers, lack of competition and inefficient production 
techniques. The concept of technical efficiency was introduced by Farrell (1957) and measures the effectiveness 
by which a given set of inputs is used to produce an output. A firm is technically efficient if it is producing the 
maximum output from the minimum quantity of inputs, such as labor, capital and technology (Sifunjo et al., 
2014). The technical efficiency can therefore be applied to gauge productivity loss which may not be captured in 
the accounting based ratios. 
 
There are two approaches mainly used to compute the efficiency values. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
developed by measures the amounts of inputs used to produce outputs in a decision making unit (Charnes et al., 
1978). This is a linear programming approach for measuring the efficiency of a multiple input and multiple 
output of an individual decision making unit (DMU).  The measures of efficiency are based on either the output 
or the input set. The output-oriented approach of efficiency determines the extent to which output could be 
increased given inputs. On the other hand, the input-oriented approach measures the extent to which firms could 
proportionally reduce inputs to produce a given quantity of output. The use of DEA as a measure of efficiency 
has been used in several corporate governance studies (Abdullahi, et al. 2012; Kamaruddin and Abokaresh, 
2012; Kang, 2009).  However, it is considered inadequate in measuring efficiency as it does not take account of 
the measurement errors.  
 
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is considered superior as it allows the estimation of cost efficiency by 
decomposing the stochastic term into an inefficiency component and random error. According Coelli (2007), the 
SFA captures deviations values from the maximum attainable output for a given level of input in a firm and also 
allow controlling firm level and industry characteristics that could influence firm efficiency.  Coelli (2007) 
indicates that under the SFA, the estimated inefficiency for any firm is taken as the conditional mean or of the 
distribution of the inefficiency term, given the observation of the composed error term  and can be estimated for 
both and cost and technical efficiency functions.  Several authors the SFA approach to measure efficiency in 
corporate governance research (Destefanis and Sena, 2007; Ochi and Yosra, 2012; Ayadi, 2014; Tanna et al., 
2009; Ravi and Hovey, 2013).  
 
4.0 Methods of Data Acquisition and Analysis in Corporate Governance Research  
 
4.1  Data Sources  
According to Saunders et al. (2009) most organizations collect and store data to support their operations which 
can be utilized in research.  The information about main shareholders, board members, financial and accounting 
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information is provided in the annual reports of listed companies. The capital markets and stock exchange 
regulations require all listed companies to disclose in their annual reports, the names of the major shareholders in 
a company and board composition.  The annual reports of listed companies are usually stored by the capital 
markets authority and the stock exchanges. The annual reports can also be downloaded from company websites. 
Some historical market information for listed companies is also kept by stock exchanges and document as 
handbooks. In some cases it may be necessary to either contact firms directly or use other public records in order 
to complete missing information.  
 
4.2   Use of panel data  
Most studies in corporate governance research use panel data and the companies are the   unit of analysis 
(Ongore et al., 2011; Mei, 2013; Mishari et al. 2012; Wei et al, 2005). Panel data also known as longitudinal or 
cross-sectional time-series is a dataset in which the behavior of entities is observed across time. Longitudinal 
data is important as it enables the researcher to study change and development in variables under study while 
cross sectional data provides current information about a phenomenon (Saunders, et al., 2009). The main 
strength of using panel data in corporate governance studies is that it allows researchers to control for variables 
that cannot be observed such differences in firm characteristics which could influence firm performance. There 
are several soft wares of data analysis which handle panel data.  For instance, the Stata soft ware handles panel 
data by using the xtset commands.  Ideally use of panel data requires strongly balanced panels which imply that 
in corporate governance research, all companies should have data for all years.  While using stata software, all 
data must be declared   as panel data to allow the use time series commands.  
 
4.3  Methods of Data Analysis  
Data extracted from financial reports requires to be reduced to manageable size, developing summaries and 
extracting usable information (Cooper and Schindler, 2006).  Most corporate governance   studies examine the 
relationships   between ownership structure, corporate boards and firm performance and to achieve this, a 
combination of descriptive statistics; correlation regression analysis is used.  These methods are discussed in the 
following sub sections.  
 
4.3.1  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis  
The descriptive statistics are essential in corporate governance research as they summarize observations  in order 
to communicate the largest amount of information as simply as possible. 
Descriptive statistics provide statistical measures of central tendency and dispersion.  The main measures of 
central tendency commonly  used  in  research  are the mean, median, and mode while  common measures of 
statistical dispersion are the standard deviation, variance and  range (Cooper and Schindler, 2004; Mugenda and 
Mugenda, 2003).  Most of the studies in corporate governance research use quantitative data and hence have the 
capacity to quantify the correlation between the independent and dependent variables or between two 
independent variables. The correlation analysis measures the strength and direction of the linear relationship 
between the two variables.  
 
The correlation analysis yields two important measures of the strength.  The degree to which two or more X 
variables are related to the Y variable is expressed as the coefficient of correlation r.  The measure of strength 
can also be expressed as the coefficient of determination r2   an indicator of the proportion of variation in Y that 
is explained by the regression equation (Cooper and Schindler, 2004; Weirs, 2002).  The Cooper and Schindler 
(2004) indicate that the value of Pearson’s coefficient of correlation falls between 0.00 (no correlation) and 
+1.00 (perfect correlation). Consequently, a positive value of r indicates a positive correlation while a negative 
value indicates a negative correlation: A relationship is considered strong when r=0.5 and above, moderate if r is 
between 0.3 and 0.49 and weak if r is below 0.29 (Field, 2000). According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) 
determining the strength of the association between the variables does not imply any causal relationship but 
forms the basis for selecting variables for further regression. 
4.3.2 Panel Data Validity Tests  
There are basic assumptions which justify the use of panel regression models for prediction of relationships and 
if they are not met, then the results may be biased, inefficient or invalid (Field, 2000). Most statistical methods 
using the time series are based on the assumption that the variables and the panels are stationary. A variable is 
said to be stationary if its mean remains constant over time (Hlouska and Wagner, 2005).  Regression models 
also assume non existence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity among the data values. Autocorrelation 
occurs when the error terms of two different time periods are correlated while heteroskedasticity implies that 
variances of errors are not the same (Field, 2000). It is rare dataset meets all of the assumptions and failure to 
meet assumptions lead to biased estimates. This has led to the development of several econometric tests and use 
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of robust regression methods to ensure validity of panel regression models. Some of these modern econometric 
methods largely used in corporate governance research are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
Panel Unit Root Test 
One  of the assumptions  while  using  panel data  regression models  is that  the variables and the  panels are  
stationary. Any regression with non stationary variables is invalid and hence, any time-series application must 
start with testing stationarity of the data.  The Stata software has a series of unit root tests to examine stationarity 
of data.  These include the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), Harris-Tzavalis (HT), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS), Fisher-type and 
Breitung test. The null hypothesis under these tests is that all the panel data contain a unit root (Karaca and Ekşi, 
2012).  Consequently, if the null hypothesis is rejected then the variable can be used in regression in their level 
form (Charito, 2010).  A panel may also have unit root which mean that there is more than one trend in the 
series. A stationary series implies its statistical properties such as mean and variances are all constant over time 
will be the same in the future as they have been in the past. The Hadri (2000) and Lagrange multiplier (LM) is 
used in testing for unit roots collectively for cross-sectional units included in a certain panel. The null hypothesis 
under the test is that all the panels (trend) are stationary. Consequently, if the null hypothesis is rejected then the 
panels can be used in regression the way they are.  
 
However, where the panel data is not stationary, it can convert into a stationary form through the use of 
mathematical transformational differencing (Charito, 2010; Mule et al., 2013). Differencing involves making the 
series stationary by transform it into a series of period-to-period differences. The first difference of a time series 
is the series of changes from one period to the next.  For  instance if Yt denotes the value of the time series Y at 
period t, then the first difference of Y at period t is equal to Yt-Yt-1.( Magee, 2013) . Where a unit root is 
established, the researcher should investigate whether there is a relationship between the variables using a 
cointegration test. Stock and Watson, (1988) indicate that cointegration refers to the fact that two or more series 
share a common trend.   According to Charito (2010), when non-stationary variables are not cointegrated, they 
can be differenced to achieve stationarity and their differenced values be used in the regression model.  
 
Hausman Test 
A common occurrence in panel data is that each entity has its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the independent variables. There are two regression models designed analyze the effects of individual 
effects. These are the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random Effects (RE) regression models (Park, 2011). A 
regression model with an FE option examines   the relationship between predictor and outcome variables with 
the assumption that something within the company which is the unit of analysis may impact or bias the predictor 
or outcome variables and we need to control for this. This is the rationale behind the assumption of the 
correlation between entity’s error term and predictor variables. The FE model controls for all time-invariant 
differences between the individuals, so the estimated coefficients of the FE models cannot be biased because of 
omitted time-invariant characteristics.  FE removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics so we can 
assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable. Another important assumption of the FE model is 
that those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other 
individual characteristics. 
 
On the other hand the RE model assumes that the variation across entities is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. The main distinction between 
fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with 
the regressors in the model (Green, 2008). Given the two options of regression models applicable in analyzing 
panel data a researcher has to choose which model (FE or RE) is more relevant and significant. The appropriate 
approach of choosing between FE and RE is running a Hausman specification test to determine the more 
efficient model (Borensteina et al., 2010; Koskinen, 2012). The procedure involves running both the FE and the 
RE regression models, saving the estimates and testing whether the unique errors are correlated with the 
independent variables. Under the test, the null hypothesis is that there is no significant correlation between the 
individual effects and the independent variables. A rejection of the null hypothesis confirms the argument in 
favor of the FE against the RE model.  
 
3.7.4 Regression Models with Robust Standad Error Option  
Panel dataset rarely meets all of the assumptions underlying use of regression models which could lead to biased 
estimates. It is recognized that panel data widely used in corporate governance research is extracted from 
companies which can be categorized by industry or grouped into years implying that there are repetitive 
measuring of values. It is likely that the errors of different observations can be highly correlated (autocorrelation 
of errors) with the adjacent time. This between-group variation could be the sources of differences in variances 
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or heteroscedasticity (Schmidheiny, 2013). According to Saunders et al. (2009) heteroskedasticity among the 
data values, leads to biased, inconsistent and less accurate or invalid results. Contemporaneous correlation also 
described as cross-sectional dependence of errors, is also in panel data with long time series and can lead to bias 
in regression results (Srivastava and Dwivedi, 1979). According to Baltagi (2001) cross-sectional dependence is 
a problem in macro panels with long time series (over 20-30 years).  
 
To ensure validity of the statistical results, most recent studies in corporate governance which include a 
regression on panel data therefore adjust the standard errors of the coefficient estimates for possible dependence 
in the residuals (Candida, et al., 2015; Dimitris et al, 2016; Kim and Rasheed, 2013). The Stata provides the 
option to estimate standard errors that are robust to certain violations of the underlying econometric model. This 
involves the selection of Stata commands and options that produce robust standard error estimates for linear 
panel model 
 
The regression analysis generates several outputs. The F-ratio tests whether the overall regression model is a 
good fit for the data. The output shows whether  the independent variables significantly predict the dependent 
variable In corporate governance research, it is measures whether  the joint ownership or  corporate board 
variables included  in the regression  model influence  the firm financial performance significantly. The R2 value 
also called the coefficient of determination which is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that can 
be explained by the independent variables. Field, (2000) indicates the proportion of variation accounted for by 
the regression model. The regression model also generates t value which test for the statistical significance of 
each of the independent variables. In stata procedure, the t-value and corresponding p-value are located in the "t" 
and "P>|t|" columns. If a p-value is less than 0.05 it can be concluded that the coefficients are statistically 
significantly different from 0 (zero) at that level. A researcher can also choose a significance level of 0.10 or 
0.01. In these cases, the lower the p-value the higher the relevance of the variable.  
 
5.0 Conclusions 
This paper examines the measurements and the methods of data analysis in corporate governance research. This 
study observes that ownership and corporate boards are the key independent variables used to explain firm 
financial   performance. Ownership structure is defined by the percentage of shareholders who include: the 
government, foreign and institutional shareholders, large individuals and dispersed owners.  Corporate board 
variables include board size measured by the total number of board members, percentage of non executive 
directors and women directors. Financial performance has been measured using three different types of 
indicators. Some studies use accounting-based ratios such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE) while others use the Tobin’s Q ratio. Some studies also use efficiency indicators computed using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochaistic Frontier Approach (SFA).  It is also apparent that most studies in 
corporate governance research use panel data extracted from financial reports. Most of the studies use a 
combination of descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis to examine the relationships between 
ownership structure, corporate boards and firm performance. Due to assumptions associated with of panel data, a 
unit root test is used to examine stationarity of data while a Hausman test determines whether to use a Fixed 
Effects (FE) or Random effects regression model. A regression model with a robust standard error option is often 
used to control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation which may lead to spurious results.   
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